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Alasdair MacIntyre’s Contribution to Marxism: A
Road not Taken
Abstract: This essay questions, through a critique of his reading of classical Marxism,
the path taken by Alasdair MacIntyre since his break with the Marxist Left in the 1960s.
It argues that MacIntyre was uncharitable in his criticisms of Marxism, or at least in
his conflation of the most powerful aspects of the classical Marxist tradition with the
crudities of Kautskyian and Stalinist materialism. Contra MacIntyre, this essay locates
in the writings of the revolutionary Left which briefly flourished up to and just after
the Russian Revolution a rich source of dialectical thinking on the relationship between
structure and agency that escapes the twin errors of crude materialism or political
voluntarism. Moreover, it suggests that by reaching back to themes reminiscent of the
young Marx this tradition laid the basis for a renewed ethical Marxism, and that in
his youth MacIntyre pointed to the realisation of this project.
0. Introduction
“Dialectical idealism is closer to intelligent [dialectical] materialism
than metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid materialism.”
(Lenin 1961b, 274)
Since his break with the Marxist Left four decades ago, Alasdair MacIntyre
has argued that while the young Marx aimed at understanding how “reason-
ing, especially practical reasoning, [gave] expression to forms of social practice”
(MacIntyre 1994, 35), the older Marx came to embrace a form of mechanical
materialism represented by the base-superstructure metaphor. Thus, in 1968,
MacIntyre claimed that in his mature writings Marx understood the economic
base and the political and ideological superstructure as standing “in external,
contingent, causal relationship to each other”. Repeating this claim in 1995,
he suggested that this reified way of conceptualising the relationship between
politics, economics, ideology and so forth reflected the extent to which Marx’s
thought was “distorted in a characteristically bürgerlich manner” (MacIntyre
1995a, 136–137; xviii; 1970, 60–61).
One consequence of this error was that Marx failed to register as a problem,
and therefore did not see the need to analyse, the ethical dimension of working-
class agency. On the contrary, he combined an assumed but undeveloped variant
of an Aristotelian virtue ethics with empirical observations of the class struggle
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between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, to deduce that proletarian agency
would foster a virtuous alternative to capitalism. Discussing this deduction in
his essay “The Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken” (1994), MacIntyre
argues that, by contrast with Marx’s expectations to the contrary, the process
of proletarianisation has simultaneously made resistance a necessary part of the
lives of the working class, while robbing that resistance of those characteristics
which might underpin a virtuous alternative to capitalism (MacIntyre 1998b,
232). He claims, consequently, that Marx’s wager on the proletariat cannot to-
day be justified, and that had Marx developed the implicit Aristotelianism of his
early concept of working-class practice he might have recognised the limitations
of this practice, and, thus, the utopian nature of his own political optimism.
MacIntyre suggests that it was Lenin who most cogently recognised the limita-
tions of proletarian practice, and it was this that led him to argue that workers
could not create socialism under their own impetus and must therefore be led
by bourgeois intellectuals: “What resulted”, MacIntyre notes, “scarcely needs
comment” (MacIntyre 1985b, 247).
If a variant of this argument informed MacIntyre’s break with the Marxist
Left in the 1960s, his articulation of the concept of social practices in After
Virtue and elsewhere can be read as an attempt to complete a project begun by
Marx in 1845 but discarded thereafter: the search for those forms of practice that
might underpin a virtuous alternative to capitalism. Indeed, Kelvin Knight has
argued that while MacIntyre has never “abandoned Marx’s idea of revolutionary
practice”, he has abandoned “’the Marxism of the Second, Third and Fourth
Internationals’, including the Leninist understanding of revolution as an event
to be effected by a small community of cadres, using the working class as their
instrument” (Knight 2007, 122).
In this essay, I challenge this reading of classical Marxism with a view to
suggesting a re-appraisal of MacIntyre’s early Marxist writings. As MacIntyre
himself once pointed out, Marx’s base-superstructure metaphor need not be
interpreted as a variant of mechanical materialism (MacIntyre 1998a), and while
it came to be interpreted in such a way by both Kautsky (at his worse, cf.
Blackledge 2006b) and by Stalin, the insights of the young Marx were renewed
by the revolutionary Left of the Second and Third Internationals in the all too
brief moment between the lead up to 1917 and the Stalinist counter-revolution.
In this essay I examine the process through which sections of the revolutionary
Left in this period decisively broke with mechanical materialism. I suggest that
it was MacIntyre himself who pointed to the consummation of this project in
the 1950s, and that it is a minor political tragedy that he did not develop his
early insights in this direction.
1. Towards an Ethical Marxism: Lenin, Lukács and Gross-
man
In “Rights, Practices and Marxism” (1985), MacIntyre wrote, fairly convention-
ally of Lenin, that unlike Marx he recognised that because the working class did
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not have the moral resources necessary to construct a socialist future he revised
Marxism to become the ghost in the machine, offering leadership to the working
class through the socialist intelligentsia (MacIntyre 1985b, 247). By this route,
as he argued in After Virtue, in conditions of moral impoverishment, Marxists
were wont to construct their own “versions of the Ubermensch”: “Lukács’s ideal
proletarian” or “Leninism’s ideal revolutionary” for instance (MacIntyre 1985a,
261–262).
Despite the widespread acceptance of something like this interpretation of
Lenin’s politics, it is simply not the case that he believed that that the working
class was too morally impoverished to lead a socialist revolution. Rather, as a
socialist intellectual, his efforts were focused on what he could do to advance the
workers’ struggles. For instance, in an early critique of the ‘egal Marxist’ Peter
Struve, he argued that, while it was a weakness with traditional moral theory
that it failed “to connect its ‘ideals’ with any immediate interests”, Struve ran the
“risk of becoming an apologist” for the status quo because he erred in the oppo-
site direction by reducing materialism to its objectivist caricature. In opposition
to both moral subjectivism and economic objectivism, Lenin suggested that ma-
terialism, because it examined the contradictions of any social process, “includes
partisanship . . . and enjoins the direct and open adoption of the standpoint of
a definite social group in any assessment of events” (Lenin 1960, 400–401). The
break with any form of dualism between science and morality that is implicit to
this argument, was subsequently reinforced through Lenin’s attempt to realise
the project of What is to be Done? (Lenin 1961a).
It is one of history’s ironies that a core constituent of the myth of Leninism,
constructed by the Stalinists from the mid-1920s onwards to justify their own
power and accepted by Western liberal intellectuals thereafter for their own
ideological reasons, includes a key constituent part of the Bersteinian revisionism
which Lenin fought from the outset: what Mészáros calls Bernstein’s “patronizing
treatment of the working classes” (Mészáros 1995, 4). According to Lars Lih in
his definitive study of What is to be Done?, in the ‘textbook interpretation’ of
Leninism, Lenin’s contempt for the intellectual capacities of workers was reflected
in his insistence on building a party of professional revolutionaries who would
bring socialist ideas to the working class from without and subsequently lead this
class in a top-down manner. By contrast with this myth, Lih shows that Lenin’s
underlying assumption in What is to Be Done? was an optimism about the
possibility of the growth of socialist consciousness within the Russian working
class, combined with scathing criticisms of the weaknesses of Russia’s radical
intelligentsia generally and the Russian socialist movement specifically, which,
he claimed, were in grave danger of failing the workers’ movement in the coming
revolution (Lih 2006, 27; 615; cf. Blackledge 2006a).
Concretely, Lenin polemicised against the re-emergence of economism within
Russian social democracy—the local variant of Bernsteinian reformism. A cru-
cial constituent part of Bernstein’s revisionism included a rejection of what he
believed to be Marxism’s romanticisation of the working class. Against Marx,
Bernstein claimed that the working class was “not yet sufficiently developed to
take over political power”, and that the only people who disagreed with this
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prognosis were those pseudo-revolutionaries “who have never had any close re-
lationship with the real labour movement” (Bernstein 1993, 206). Similarly, the
Russian ‘economist’ Krichevski accused the Iskra group of “being over-optimistic
about the possibility of proletarian awareness and organisation”, and insisted
that workers were interested only in basic bread and butter issues, not socialist
politics. Against Krichevski, Lenin argued in Lih’s paraphrase, that “worker
militancy is not the problem because it is increasing in leaps and bounds all
on its own. The problem, the weak link, is effective party leadership of all this
militancy” (Lih 2006, 316–317). Indeed, Lenin suggested that socialists who
spoke only of bread and butter issues to workers both patronised them whilst
simultaneously failing to challenge the hegemony of bourgeois ideology within
the working class (226).
Unfortunately, as is widely known, in so far as Lenin theorised this position
he borrowed concepts from Kautsky who insisted that “socialist consciousness is
something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without” (Lenin
1961a, 384, 375). Given the preponderance of crude nonsense written about
this argument, two points are worth stressing. First, the relationship between
spontaneity and consciousness is not the central thesis of What is to be Done?.
Rather, Lenin’s discussion of this point was hurriedly added to the text as a re-
sponse to Krichevski’s discussion of the relationship between spontaneous move-
ments and conscious leadership in an article published as Lenin was writingWhat
is to be Done?. Second, understood in the context noted above it is clear, as
Lih points out, that on this issue Lenin meant the opposite of what he typically
taken as meaning. It was his opponents who dismissed the socialist potential of
working-class struggle, whereas he defended it.
Elsewhere Lenin did address the question of the relationship between so-
cialism and the movement from below in terms which both confirm Lih’s in-
terpretation of that text and which point to his developing break with Second
International dualism (cf. Cliff 1986, 81; Lenin 1962, 32). Indeed, whereas Kaut-
sky famously wrote that “social democracy is a revolutionary party, but it is not
a party that makes revolution” (Kautsky, in Salvadori 1979, 40), for Lenin the
party “would not sit round waiting for the call to insurrection, but would carry
out such regular activity that would guarantee the highest probability of success
in the event of an insurrection” (Lenin, in: Harman 1996, 31).
If the gap between Lenin and Kautsky was only implicit before 1914, the
shock of war and Lenin’s subsequent reading of Hegel made his split with his
former teacher explicit and absolute. In notes taken from a close reading of
Hegel’s Science of Logic he expressed his break with dualism thus: “The activ-
ity of man, who has made an objective picture of the world for himself, changes
external actuality, abolishes its determinates (= alters some sides or other, quali-
ties of it), thus removes from it the features of semblance, externality and nullity,
and makes it as being in and for itself (=objectively true)” (Lenin 1961b, 217–
218). Commenting on these notebooks, Stathis Kouvelakis points out that it is
“particularly significant that Lenin ended the section on “philosophical materi-
alism” with a reference to the notion of ‘revolutionary practical activity’ ”. For
Lenin understood subjective practical activity to be at the centre of the “ob-
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jective” world, and consequently insisted that social scientific laws should not
be “fetishised” as things distinct from conscious human activity but instead be
recognised as necessarily “narrow, incomplete, [and] approximate” attempts to
frame political intervention (Kouvelakis 2007, 174, 186). Consequently, whereas
Second International theorists had interpreted Hegel’s claim that to act freely
meant to act in accordance with necessity in a reductive manner, for Lenin,
as Day argues, “man’s consciousness not only reflects the objective world but
creates it” (Day, in: Anderson 1995, 113). In fact, as Callinicos argues, it was
because Lenin was unsure about the future that he acted with the intention
of influencing the course of history: his activism was rooted in his belief that
“the very unpredictability of history requires that we intervene to help shape it”
(Callinicos 2007, 26).
Commenting on Lenin’s overall political trajectory, Lukács argued that “the
development which Marxism thus underwent through Lenin consists merely—
merely!—in its increasing grasp of the intimate, visible, and momentous connex-
ion between individual actions and general destiny—the revolutionary destiny
of the whole working class” (Lukács 1970, 13). If Lenin’s praxis led him to a
break with Kautskyism, it was in part because, as he argued, “practice is higher
than (theoretical) Knowledge” (Lenin 1961b, 213). Nevertheless, the break with
the Second International had to be theorised, and while Lenin, in State and
Revolution, went back to Marx and Engels’ criticisms of the Gotha and Erfurt
programmes to argue that the key political error of Kautskyism was its strategic
orientation towards the state, Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness magnif-
icently articulated this break at a philosophical level.
According to Martin Jay, Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness “can be
seen as the most articulate expression on a theoretical level of the world-historical
events of 1917” (Jay 1984, 103). More specifically, Arato and Breines point out
that within this book Lukács developed a “powerful critique of Kantian ethics”
(Arato/Breines 1979, 126). Indeed, Lukács’ book includes a criticism of Kant’s
concept of the thing-in-itself, which, he argued, underpinned the antinomies of
his philosophy by acting as a limit to human knowledge of the world. More-
over, Lukács claimed that this element of Kant’s philosophy was characteristic
of bourgeois social theory more generally—that is theory from the standpoint of
civil society—which could not escape the antinomies between, for instance, free-
dom and necessity, fact and value, form and content, and subject and object (Jay
1984, 110). These antinomies, Lukács suggested, were reproduced within Second
International Marxism, and their transcendence became a possibility only with
the rediscovery of the living concept of the totality associated with Lenin’s return
to Marx (Lukács 1970). Concretely, Lukács insisted that the totality can only be
conceived from the standpoint of a social class (Lukács 1971, 28). More specifi-
cally, it is only with the rise of capitalism, that is with the break with the last
vestiges of the natural economy, that it becomes possible to conceptualise society
as a totality, and of the two central classes of modern capitalism, only the pro-
letariat is able to conceive the totality as a historical form. Marxism, as the sci-
entific understanding of capitalist society, emerged and could have only emerged
from the standpoint of the practice of the proletariat. Indeed, whereas Kant had
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argued that the essence of the world, the thing-in-itself, remained shrouded in
mystery, Lukács countered that at its essence capitalism was a system of gener-
alised commodity production within which, fundamentally, human labour-power
was a commodity. The emergence of proletarian class-consciousness thus coin-
cided with the growing self-consciousness of the capitalist mode of production as
a totality: the proletariat could potentially become the “unmediated conscious-
ness of the commodity” (Lukács 1971, 173). Conversely, while the bourgeoisie,
like the proletariat existed as global class, it was unable to conceive capitalism
as a totality because of the structurally competitive relations between its indi-
vidual members. Human liberation could only come from a global class, and the
bourgeoisie, unlike the proletariat, was incapable of playing this role because,
while it was global, it was also necessarily fragmented.
Lukács’ deployed the concept of “imputed class consciousness” to describe
the relationship of Marxism to the actual political consciousness of the working
class. MacIntyre, like others of his critics have often pointed to this concept
to suggest that while Lukács aimed to overcome the dualism characteristic of
Second International theory, in practice he failed to conceptualise the movement
towards class consciousness within the working class except as an epiphenomena
of a mythical final collapse of capitalism (Stedman Jones 1977, 42). Against
this argument, John Rees has pointed out that in both History and Class Con-
sciousness, and in the recently discovered defence of that book, Tailism and the
Dialectic, Lukács did indeed point to the process by which workers could develop
class consciousness (Rees 2000, 28–32). In fact, Lukács insisted that the emer-
gence of socialist consciousness within the working class “does not lie outside
the real process of history. It does not have to be introduced into the world by
philosophers” (Lukács 1971, 77). More specifically, he argued that the revolu-
tionary party should not be understood as an elite group of intellectuals, but
should rather be thought of as “that part of the proletariat that spontaneously
rebels against its leaders’ behaviour” (Lukács 1971, 289). More specifically, he
suggested that “in no sense is it the party’s role to impose any kind of abstract,
cleverly devised tactics upon the masses. On the contrary, it must continuously
learn from their struggle and their conduct of it. But it must remain active while
it learns” (Lukács 1970, 36; cf. 1971, 331, 334). Consequently, for Lukács, as
Michael Löwy has pointed out, “ ‘imputed’ class consciousness is not a transcen-
dental entity, an “absolute value” floating in the world of ideas: on the contrary,
it assumes an historical, concrete and revolutionary shape - the Communist
Party” (Löwy 2003, 183; cf. Rees 1998, 219–225; Lukács 2000, 63–86). More-
over, this model of revolutionary leadership is predicated upon the existence of a
spontaneous socialist working-class movement from below, and by synthesising
revolutionary leadership and the movement from below Lukács confronted full
square Kautsky’s dualism.
Commenting on Auer’s famous letter to Bernstein which suggested a de facto
reformist practice as a more efficient strategy for changing the party than Bern-
stein’s frontal assault on the programme, Lukács claimed that Auer’s proposed
project had in practice been realised by Kautsky; for Kautsky deployed Marx’s
concepts, while simultaneously assuming a dualism between facts and values
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which effectively neutered Marxism by clinging to its vocabulary whilst jettison-
ing its practice (Lukács 1972, 133). More generally on the revisionist debate,
Lukács claimed that Bernstein’s embrace of Kantian moralism reflected not the
transcendence of Second International fatalism, but its opposite side: it “is the
subjective side of the missing category of totality” (Lukács 1971, 38). Indeed,
while Lukács agreed with Kautsky’s criticisms of the formalism of Kant’s ethics
(cf. Kautsky 1918), he pointed out that it was not enough to conclude that any
moral imperatives derived from this perspective were an inadequate basis for
socialist strategic thought. Rather Kant’s ethical formalism pointed back to the
methodological problem of his concept of the thing-in-itself which acted in his
system as a fundamental limit to human knowledge of the world (Lukács 1971,
124–125). Thus the critique of Kant’s ethical formalism should have pointed
Kautsky back to the concept of the totality. That it did not reflected the way
in which his dualism allowed him to talk revolution whilst abandoning the real
practical leadership of the party to the reformists.
Lukács argued that whereas Kant assumed that social reality was a given,
by showing that it was in fact a product of human history Hegel had pointed
beyond this dualism, and by materialising Hegel’s project Marx had overcome
it. To separate free human actions from a necessarily given social world, as was
done by the neo-Kantians, implied losing sight of the fact that both freedom
and necessity existed in a dynamic relationship such that not only is the world a
product of human actions, but the kind of people that we are is itself a product
of history: in Parkinson’s paraphrase “we are both producer and product of the
historical process” (Parkinson 1977, 43). The consequence of this methodological
movement was to unfreeze the concepts through which we aim to understand
the world. As Jay argues, “Being would then be understood as Becoming, things
would dissolve into processes, and most important of all, the subjective origin
of those processes would become apparent to the identical subject-object of
history” (Jay 1984, 111). Indeed, Lukács suggested, a key philosophical task “is
to discover the principles by means of which it becomes possible in the first place
for an ‘ought’ to modify existence. And it is just this that [Kant’s] theory rules
out from the start” (Lukács 1971, 161; cf. Arato/Breines 1979, 127).
Concretely, the aim of History and Class Consciousness was “to demonstrate
methodologically that the organisation and tactics of Bolshevism are the only
possible consequence of Marxism” (Lukács 2000, 47). Lukács argued, the struc-
ture of both the SPD specifically and the Second International more generally
reflected their de facto reformism, while the Bolshevik Party, because it was
built as a combat organisation, became the organisational embodiment of the
Marxist transcendence of dualism: Lenin’s aim was not to comment upon objec-
tive developments within the world but to shape such processes through praxis
(Lukács 1971, 295-342).
Lukács suggested that two works were of fundamental importance to the re-
newal of Marxism out of the degeneration of the Second International orthodoxy:
Lenin’s State and Revolution and Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Cap-
ital (Lukács 1971, 34–35). According to Lukács, through his book Lenin com-
pleted his political break with Second International fatalism, while Luxemburg
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played a similar role in freeing Marx’s economic theory from Second Interna-
tional Marxism. Luxemburg’s study was intended as an extension of her earlier
critique of Bernstein’s rejection of the Marx’s breakdown theory. Whereas Kaut-
sky denied that Marx held to such a model, in Reform or Revolution Luxemburg
argued that the contradictions of capitalism will progressively worsen “resulting
inevitably, at some point, in its collapse” (Luxemburg 1989, 29). Similarly, in
The Accumulation of Capital, she claimed that capitalism “must break down”
and that at “a certain stage of development there will be no other way out than
the application of socialist principles” (1951, 467). Whatever the undoubted
merits of this argument, it is open to the criticism that by embracing a theory
of breakdown Luxemburg did not actually succeed in theorising a break with
Second International fatalism.
By contrast with this line of argument, Rick Kuhn has recently argued that
the problem with Luxemburg’s analysis of capitalism lay not in her embrace of a
theory of breakdown, but the substantive arguments through which she defended
this theory. Kuhn argues that it was to this problem that the early Frankfurt
School Marxist, Henryk Grossman, applied himself in his classic The Law of
Accumulation and the Breakdown of the Capitalist System (1929). Grossman
claimed that Luxemburg’s arguments failed because they were “not rooted in
the immanent laws of the accumulation process, but in the transcendental fact
of the absence of non-capitalist markets” (Grossman, in: Kuhn 2007, 126). In re-
lation to Bernstein, Grossman insisted that he “was perfectly right in saying [. . . ]
‘if the triumph of socialism were truly an immanent economic necessity, then it
would have to be grounded in a proof of the inevitable economic breakdown of
the present order of society” ’ (Grossman 1992, 39). By denying that Marx held
to a theory of breakdown, Kautsky fatally damaged his critique of Bernstein by
accepting his basic assumptions about the nature of capitalism. Grossman went
on to say that it was Luxemburg’s great contribution to the revisionist debate
to return to Marx and defend the theory of breakdown. Unfortunately, because
she shifted “the crucial problem of capitalism from the sphere of production to
that of circulation” she undermined her own arguments. Moreover, she tended to
conceive of the breakdown as a “mechanical” process, which consequently opened
her defence of the theory to the charge of “fatalism” (1992, 41–42). Somewhat
ironically, given this criticism of Luxemburg, in 1934 Grossman was criticised
by Anton Pannekoek for apparently reducing Marxism to a form of mechanical
materialism (Pannekoek 1977, 62). Actually Grossman followed Lenin in insist-
ing that “there is no absolutely hopeless situation” for capital. He believed that
a defensible theory of economic breakdown must be integrated into an adequate
theory of political revolution. His goal was thus to overcome the problems with
Luxemburg’s defence of the theory of breakdown such that it could be devel-
oped as a theoretical basis for political action. Against political fatalism, he
insisted that capitalist breakdown was not an automatic, mechanical process;
whilst against political voluntarism he pointed out that an adequate theory of
political practice must be rooted in an understanding of the crisis prone dynamic
of the capitalist system. Consequently, as Kuhn explains, Grossman aimed to
do for the Marxist approach to the critique of political economy what Lenin
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had done for politics and what Lukács had down for philosophy: to transcend
Second International dualism through a dialectical approach to the relationship
between freedom and necessity (Kuhn 2007, 125).
Concretely, Grossman insisted that Second International theorists had de-
parted from Marx’s theory of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
It was this secular tendency, he argued, itself rooted in the capital accumula-
tion process, which condemned capitalism to recurrent crises. Following Marx’s
method of moving from the abstract to the concrete, Grossman opened his book
with an abstract model of capitalism’s tendency towards crisis. He then shifted
to examine the countervailing tendencies which mediated against breakdown.
Finally, in a section that is unfortunately absent from the English edition of his
book, he examined the interaction between crises and class struggle. Arguing
that no crisis is irresolvable so long as workers are prepared to pay the price, he
pointed out that the class struggle would itself “shape the actual course of the
system’s tendency to break down” (1992, 135). Kuhn points out that Grossman
took the British miners’ strike of 1926 as an example of the dialectical relation-
ship between economics and politics in a period of crisis: economic crisis set
the scene for miners’ lockout and the General Strike, but the actual outcome
of these struggles and thus of the economic crisis itself was ultimately deter-
mined by the political struggle. Writing to Paul Mattick two years after the
completion of his book, Grossman pointed out that his aim had been to show
how “objective revolutionary situations arise”, which inform the intensification
of the class struggle, but which neither mechanically guarantee the victory of
either side in these struggles, nor determine the outcome of the crisis itself: “The
purpose of my breakdown theory was not to exclude this active intervention, but
rather to show when and under what circumstances such an objectively given
revolutionary situation can and does arise.” (Grossman, in Kuhn 2007, 144)
2. Revolutionary Ethics
If Lenin, Lukács and Grossman all added to the renewal of Marxism through a
break with Second International dualism, it is unfortunate that none of them
made more than tentative comments on the ethical dimension of socialism. Nev-
ertheless, two works were produced in this period which pointed towards a Marx-
ist ethics: Evgeny Pashukanis’s Law and Marxism (1924), and Leon Trotsky’s
‘Their Moral and Ours” (1938).
According to Pashukanis there exists an intimate and necessary relationship
between the emergence of the idea of individual equality and the system of
generalised commodity production: “For the products of human labour to be able
to relate to each other as values”, he wrote, “it is necessary for people to relate
to each other as autonomous and equal personalities” (Pashukanis 1978, 151).
Indeed, Pashukanis insisted that three conditions must be satisfied for capital
accumulation to become generalised: people must become “moral subjects”, “legal
subjects”, and they must live their lives “egoistically”. Corresponding to this
situation, moral law, far from being a universal good, is best understood as
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the ideological form necessary to regulate the “intercourse between commodity
owners”. A consequence of the relationship between morality as the ideology of
free action and capitalism as a system of social compulsion, Pashukanis argued
that there is a necessary ambiguity in the moral law whereby, on the one hand,
it presents itself as the rational basis for the actions of free individuals, while, on
the other hand, it is a social law standing above individuals (Pashukanis 1978,
154). The only way to rid the moral law of this ambiguity, he claimed, is to
eliminate capitalism through the creation of a planned economy. However, in so
doing, the atomised nature of our present day individuality would be overcome,
and so would the basis for the ethical form itself (158). Thus, just as the struggle
for socialism involves a struggle against states and laws then it similarly involves
the struggle against morality (160).
Trotsky’s pamphlet Their Morals and Ours was written in a more concrete
register than was Pashukanis’ book, and as an explicit challenge to those for
whom Marxism was a crude form of moral consequentialism, according to which
“the ends justified the means”. In opposition to such interpretations of Marxism,
Trotsky first insisted that any adequate ethical theory must have an eye to the
ends of action, as the alternative most fully expressed by Kant, could not survive
without the idea of God, and thus represented a backwards step after Darwin
(16–17). While Trotsky therefore argued that “a means can only be justified by
its end”, he also pointed out that “the end in its turn needs to be justified”. He
subsequently proceeded to offer two Marxist justifications of the end of revolu-
tionary socialist action: first, “if it leads to increasing the power of humanity over
nature and to the abolition of the power of one person over another”; second,
which is really a variation on the first, “that is permissible [. . . ] which really leads
to the liberation of humanity” (48). Whereas the distance between this formu-
lation and Bernstein’s Neo-Kantianism is plain, it is less obvious that Trotsky’s
model escapes the charge of consequentialism. Nevertheless, Trotsky did insist
that Marxism “does not know dualism between means and ends”, and suggested
a “dialectical independence” between the two. Thus he repeated Lassalle’s sug-
gestion that “a different path gives rise to a different goal”. Moreover, he claimed
that “not all means are permissible”, and because “the liberation of the workers
can only come through the workers themselves” then only those means are per-
missible “which unite the revolutionary proletariat”. Indeed, any means which
lowers the “faith of the masses in themselves”, by, for instance, “replacing it by
a worship for the ‘leaders’ ” is not permissible (49-51).
Whatever the shortcomings of this short pamphlet, Trotsky’s argument cer-
tainly does not fit easily with the claim that Marxism is a form of dualism which
posits itself as the ideology of the leaders who use the working class as an instru-
ment in their struggle for state power. Moreover, against the claim that Trotsky
simply regurgitated a form of consequentialism, John Dewey pointed out that
Trotsky had in fact made an implicit differentiation between two types of ends:
final ends and those ends which are themselves means to the final end. While
Trotsky had not made this differentiation explicit in Their Morals and Ours,
Dewey suggested that it would be a simple matter to so do. Moreover, if this
were done then Trotsky could, quite rigorously, claim both to have defended the
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interdependence of means and ends, and to have provided an answer to those
who argue that by positing only some distant end, consequentialism does not
actually reflect on the observable short-term consequences of the means deployed
to reach this end (Dewey 1973, 68–69). Nevertheless, despite these strengths,
Dewey claimed that the force of Trotsky’s position was weakened by what he
perceived to be a dogmatic “deduction” of the claim that the agency of radical
change would be the working class: “the selection of class struggle as a means”,
Dewey insists, has itself “to be justified” (1973, 70–71).
That workers’ struggles might generate a real need for solidarity which could
underpin emerging socialist virtues was, to my knowledge, never explicitly de-
fended by any of the intellectuals discussed above, and the Stalinist counter-
revolution ensured that it was not until the emergence of a New Left after 1956
that these problems re-emerged and a new generation began to look for answers
to them.
3. Conclusion
Interestingly it was through the medium of the British New Left’s debates on
socialist humanism in the late 1950s that a young MacIntyre attempted to artic-
ulate a sophisticated Marxist justification for the ethical significance of working-
class practice (Blackledge 2005; 2006c; 2007). In “Notes from the Moral Wilder-
ness” (1958–1959), he drew upon and extended Marx’s claim, as made in the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), that the separation of means
from ends characteristic of production within bourgeois society might be over-
come through workers’ struggles (Marx 1975, 365). MacIntyre suggested that
the proletariat, created objectively through the development of the forces of
production, could begin in its struggles against capital to match the potential
inherent in its objective structure and create the conditions for the solution of
the contemporary problems of morality: it potentially begins to embody the
practice which could overcome the “rift between our conception of morality and
our conception of desire” (MacIntyre 1998a, 45). Indeed, by acting in this way
workers come to realise that solidarity is not simply a useful means through
which they struggle to meet their needs, but it is in fact what they naturally
desire (1998a, 48). With this argument MacIntyre suggested a final piece of
the puzzle through which the renewal of Marxism, opened by the revolutionary
break with Kautskyism and then crushed by the rise of Stalinism, could finally
be completed.
That he subsequently came to accept the common assumption that Marxism
be condemned by Marx’s mature retreat towards a mechanical form of material-
ism rests upon a rather uncharitable reading both of his mature works and of the
works of those revolutionaries who struggled against Kautskyism and Stalinism.
If Marxism at its best escaped from the bourgeois antinomy between freedom and
necessity then this suggests more space for a rapprochement between MacIntyre
and Marxism than he would probably care to admit. Nevertheless, there remains
the problem of the ethical significance of those communities created by workers
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in struggle. If it is beyond question that such communities exist, it remains
the case that their ethical significance can only be judged by close empirical
investigation. This, I contend, is an open question of the utmost relevance to
ethical anti-capitalists. Consequently I think it an important intellectual error
on MacIntyre’s part to assert that “while proletarianisation makes it necessary
for workers to resist, it also tends to deprive workers of those forms of practice
through which they can discover conceptions of a good and of virtues adequate
to the moral needs of resistance” (1998b, 232).
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